University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 3 Spring 1984

Article 7

1984

Comments: Requiring Criminal Defendants to
Prove Blue Sky Exemptions: A Question of Due
Process
Anthony J. DiPaula
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
DiPaula, Anthony J. (1984) "Comments: Requiring Criminal Defendants to Prove Blue Sky Exemptions: A Question of Due Process,"
University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 13: Iss. 3, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol13/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

REQUIRING CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS TO PROVE
BLUE SKY EXEMPTIONS: A QUESTION OF DUE
PROCESS
The Uniform Securities Act, which has been adopted in nearly
every state, places the burden o.fproving an exemption from its
blue sky registration provisions on the person claiming the exemption. Although some courts have interpreted this to mean
the defendant has only the burden o.f raising the issue of exemption, most courts have placed the entire burden ofpersuasion on
the defendant. This comment examines both rules to determine
whether they are constitutional in light o.f the Supreme Court
decisions on sh!fting burdens.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Section 402 of the Uniform Securities Act (Uniform Act) exempts
from its registration provisions certain types of securities and securities
transactions. l Prior to the approval of the Uniform Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (National
ConferenceV the question of which party should bear the burden of
proving exemption from blue sky registration provisions in criminal
prosecutions had been raised by defendants and decided by the courts
on numerous occasions. The law was clear that the burden of proof fell
on the one who claimed the exemption. The drafters of the Uniform
Act simply codified the decisional law in section 402(d).3
Criminal defendants charged with a registration violation have
claimed that the absence of an exemption is an element of the offense
to be proven by the state, and that section 402(d) unconstitutionally
shifts upon them the burden of proving that element. Most courts have
not squarely addressed the claim, and instead have relied on the mere
presence of section 402(d) to justify allocating the entire burden of
proof to defendants.
Some time after the adoption of the Uniform Act, and for reasons
unrelated to it, a few courts began to lessen or alter the burden that the
courts had consistently placed on criminal defendants. Rather than interpreting section 402(d) literally and placing the entire burden of proving an exemption on the defendant, these courts have required only
that the defendant satisfy the burden of production by raising the claim
1. The purpose of exemptions from securities registration is best described in the

legislative history to the Securities Act of 1933 where Representative Sam Rayburn of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, speaking on behalf
of the House of Representatives, reported that "[i)t [H.R. 5480) carefully exempts
from its application certain types of securities and securities transactions where
there is no practical need for its application or where the public benefits are too
remote." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
2. The Uniform Act was originally approved by the National Conference on August
25, 1956, and was later amended in 1958. See UNIF. SEC. ACT, 7A U.L.A. 562
(1978).
3. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(d), 7A U.L.A. 645 commissioners' note (1978).
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of exemption at an appropriate time. Under this view, the ultimate
burden of persuasion remained on the state, requiring it to prove the
absence of an exemption once the issue was properly raised. These
courts, however, have remained in the minority.
Because due process constraints on shifting burdens and presumptions have been revolutionized over the past fifteen years, the time has
come to evaluate the constitutionality of section 402(d) of the Uniform
Act. This comment analyzes that provision in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions to determine whether it meets the requirements of due
process.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Evolution and Development of Section 402(d) of the Uniform
Act
Pre-Uniform Act

1.

From the beginning of blue sky regulation, courts overwhelmingly
agreed that the burden of proving an exemption in a criminal case
should fall on the one who claimed the benefit of the exemption.4
When defendants challenged their convictions on the ground that the
state should have been required to prove as an element of the offense
that the transactions or securities were not exempt, the early courts
were content either to rely on the presence of a statute similar to section
402(d) as authority for placing the burden on the defendant,S or to find
other justifications for requiring defendants to prove their entitlement
to an exemption. 6
The pre-Uniform Act courts that had a statute on which to rely
usually quoted the provision that placed the burden on the defendant,
and then, sometimes expressly, deferred to the legislature. 7 The courts
4. People v. Murphy, 17 Cal. App. 2d 575, 587, 62 P.2d 592, 598 (1936); People v.
Dean, 131 Cal. App. 228, 231, 21 P.2d 126, 128 (1933); People v. Wilson, 375 Ill.
506,513-14,31 N.E.2d 959,962 (1941); People v. Smith, 315 Ill. App. 100, 104,42
N.E.2d 119, 121 (1942); State v. Voorhies, 169 La. 626, 639, 125 So. 737, 742
(1929); Robbins v. State, 144 Neb. 43, 44-45, 12 N.W.2d 152, 153 (1943); Commonwealth v. Harrison, 137 Pa. Super. 279, 283, 8 A.2d 733, 735 (1939); Commonwealth v. Freed, 106 Pa. Super. 529, 542, 162 A. 679, 685 (1932); Kreutzer v.
Westfahl, 187 Wis. 463, 478-79, 204 N.W. 595,601 (1925).
5. E.g., People v. Wilson, 375 Ill. 506, 513, 31 N.E.2d 959,962 (1941); Robbins v.
State, 144 Neb. 43, 45, 12 N.W.2d 152, 153 (1943); Kreutzer v. Westfahl, 187 Wis.
463,478, 204 N.W. 595, 601 (1925).
6. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 89 Pa. Super. 439 (1926) (accepting trial court's
placement of the burden, without explanation); see also infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussing other justifications); if. State v. Voorhies, 169 La.
626, 639, 125 So. 737, 742 (1929) (without proof that the securities sold did not
belong to the prohibited class, the court would not assume that they were within
the exempted class).
7. See cases cited supra note 5. A prime example is Kreutzer v. Westfahl, 187 Wis.
463, 204 N.W. 595 (1925), where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated: "We
have no doubt as to the authority of the legislature to place upon defendants,
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that did not have an express statutory provision upon which to rely
either analogized to similar cases under other regulatory schemes, 8 relied upon precedent,9 or simply reasoned that the burden was properly
placed on the defendant.lO Of all the cases during this pre-Uniform
Act period, only one directly analyzed the contention that non-exemption constituted part of the offense and thus should be proven by the
prosecution. II In a straightforward manner, this court held that exemptions were not "affirmative matters necessary to constitute the crime
[but were] matters of defense to a charge of unlawful sale of stock,
which defenses may be made by the accused."12
The pre-Uniform Act courts thus held unanimously that the burden of proving an exemption should fall on the one who claims its benefit, the defendant. None of these courts, however, analyzed or even
identified a policy concern justifying this allocation of the burden of
proof. Furthermore, none questioned whether requiring a defendant to
prove an exemption violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. I3
2.

The Uniform Securities Act Section 402(d)

The National Conference adopted the Uniform Act in 1956. 14
Section 402(d) of the Uniform Act states: "In any proceeding under
this act, the burden of proving an exemption or an exception from a
defintion is upon the person claiming it."15 According to a note accompanying section 402(d), that section simply codified what had already
been decided by the courtS. 16 The note does not list the individual de-

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

accused of offenses under this statute, the burden of proving that sales made by
them come within the exemptions on which they rely." Id at 478, 204 N.W. at
601.
Commonwealth v. Freed, 106 Pa. Super. 529, 542, 162 A. 679, 685 (1932) (analogizing a prosecution for selling securities without a license to other cases involving
licenses before declaring that the burden should be on the defendant to show his
authorization, e.g., a license, for doing the act, rather than on the state to prove
that he had no license).
Commonwealth v. Harrison, 137 Pa. Super. 279, 283, 8 A.2d 733, 735 (1939) (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 89 Pa. Super. 439, 445 (1926».
People v. Dean, 131 Cal. App. 228, 231, 21 P.2d 126, 128 (1933) (one who sells
securities has a duty to investigate whether he can do so lawfully, and based on
this duty, should shoulder the burden of proving that his investigation was correct
and that he was within the bounds of the law).
People v. Murphy, 17 Cal. App. 2d 575, 585, 62 P.2d 592, 598 (1936).
Id at 586, 62 P.2d at 598. Murphy dealt with "exceptions" rather than "exemptions" that, as the note to section 402 indicates, differ only in their scope of protection. For purposes of this comment, however, the relevance of Murphy is not
diminished in the least.
U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See supra note 2.
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(d), 7A U.L.A. 642 (1978).
The note states: "This codifies existing law. See the cases cited in Loss, Securities
Regulation, (1951 & 1955 Supp.), p. 414, n. 365." UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(d), 7A
U.L.A. 645 commissioners' note (1978).
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cisions codified in section 402(d), but cites a footnote in a treatise written by the draftsman of the Uniform Act, Professor Louis LOSS.17
In that footnote, Professor Loss cites several of the pre-Uniform
Act cases discussed above. 18 He also includes several civil decisions
instituted by third persons attempting to recover funds from sellers who
failed to register either themselves as broker-dealers or the securities
they sold, and were claiming to be exempt. 19 Also cited is SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 20 a United States Supreme Court decision that briefly
discussed the propriety of requiring defendants to prove their exempt
status. 21 Because Ralston Purina arose out of an injunctive proceeding
instituted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rather
than a criminal prosecution, and because the Court was mainly concerned with defining the scope of the private offering exemption under
the Securities Act of 1933,22 the case is not dispositive of the constitutional due process question of whether criminal defendants can be required to prove exemptions. 23 The civil decisions 24 cited by Professor
Loss likewise do not dispose of the constitutional claim.
The only apparent support for applying section 402(d) in a criminal prosecution is the pre-Uniform Act decisions that failed to discuss
the constitutional question. Once codified, these decisions strongly in17. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 414 n.365 (1951).
18. Id (citing State v. Voorhies, 169 La. 626, 125 So. 737 (1929); Commonwealth v.
Freed, 106 Pa. Super. 529, 162 A.2d 679 (1932); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 89
Pa. Super. 439 (1926».
19. Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951); A.C. Frost & Co. v.
Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 61 Idaho 21, 98 P.2d 965 (1939); Dobal v. Guardian
Fin. Corp., 251 Ill. App. 220 (1929); Harvey v. Electric Refrigeration Corp., 246
Mich. 235, 224 N.W. 443 (1929).
20. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
21. The Court devoted one sentence of its opinion to the burden of proof issue:
"Keeping in mind the broadly remedial purposes of federal securities legislation,
imposition of the burden of proof on an issuer who would plead the exemption
seems to us fair and reasonable." Id at 126.
22. See 15 U.S.c. § 77d (1982).
23. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934), where the Court unanimously
invalidated a statutory scheme that required a defendant to prove American citizenship or entitlement thereto in a prosecution for violating California's Alien
Land Law. Justice Cardozo wrote: "What has been written applies only to those
provisions of the statute that prescribe the rule for criminal causes. Other considerations mayor may not apply where the controversy is civil. We leave that question open." Id at 96-97; see also Note, Affirmative J)efenses and J)ue Process: The
Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal J)efendant, 64
GEO. L.J. 871, 881-82 (1976), in which the commentator noted:
The justification for placing the burden of persuasion on a civil defendant does not apply in a criminal proceeding . . . , [b]ecause society has
no overriding need to promote the interests of either party in a civil action, [and] the risk that a litigant will be unable to satisfy his burden of
persuasion does not threaten any social interest.
Id (footnotes omitted).
24. See supra note 19. The language of section 402(d) was intended to apply "[i]n any
proceeding under th[e] act," including civil actions. This explains why Professor
Loss cited the civil cases.
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fiuenced the current trend that continues to require criminal defendants
to prove their entitlement to blue sky exemptions.
3.

Post-Uniform Act

Most cases decided after the adoption of the Uniform Act continue
to place the burden of proving an exemption from registration upon
criminal defendants. As in the cases that arose before the adoption of
the Uniform Act, the defendants contended that the absence of an exemption was an element of the offense of selling unregistered securities
or failing to register as a broker-dealer and should have been proven by
the state. Most post-Uniform Act courts dismissed this claim on
grounds identical to those relied upon by their predecessors, relying
upon pre-Uniform Act cases as precedent. 25 Those courts in states that
had adopted the Uniform Act based their decisions on statutory
equivalents to section 402(d) as well as on precedent. 26 A few post25. State v. Goodman, 110 Ariz. 524, 526-27, 521 P.2d 611, 613 (1974); State v.
Hoephner, 574 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (dictum); Sisson v. State,
404 P.2d 55, 58-59 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964) (per curiam); Nelson v. State, 355 P.2d
413, 419-20 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); Commonwealth v. Bomersbach, 260 Pa.
Super. 28, 33, 383 A.2d 995, 998 (1978).
26. See United States ex rel Shott v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1966)
(construing Ohio law), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967); State v. Barber, 133
Ariz. 572, 578, 653 P.2d 29, 35 (1982); State v. Baumann, 125 Ariz. 404, 412, 610
P.2d38, 46 (1980); People V. Skelton, 109 Cal. App. 3d 691, 724, 167 Cal. Rptr.
636,654 (1980); People v. Park, 87 Cal. App. 3d 550,556-67, 151 Cal. Rptr. 146,
154-55 (1978); State v. Buchman, 361 So. 2d 692, 694-95 (Fla. 1978) (court quoted
the statute, analyzed it to determine the elements of the offense, then, in a footnote, cited an old case standing for a rule of statutory construction); Worsley v.
State, 162 Ind. App. 34, 37-38, 317 N.E.2d 908,910-11 (1974) (court quoted statute
to support placing the burden on the defendant, then cited a civil decision as
precedent).
Forty-five states have adopted statutes with language similar to section
402(d). ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(b) (1975 & Supp. 1983); ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.55.140(c) (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2033 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-1248(d) (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25163 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 11-51-113(5) (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-490(d) (West 1958);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7309(d) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.171 (West Supp.
1983); GA. CODE § 1O-5-22(a) (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-17 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1456 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137-15A (Smith-Hurd
1960 & Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-16(j) (Burns 1984); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 502.205 (West 1949 & Supp. 1983-1984); !UN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1272
(1981); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 292.420(1) (Baldwin 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:712 (West 1965); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-604 (1975); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 402(d) (West 1958 and Supp. 1983-1984); MICH.
COMPo LAWS ANN. § 451.802(c) (West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 80A.15 subd. 4 (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71-207 (Supp. 1983);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.402(f) (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-106
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1121 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.100 (1983); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:17 V. (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-50(d) (West 1970);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-44(A) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-18(b) (1981);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.45 (Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 401(e)
(West 1965 & Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.275 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, § 1-204(c) (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1983-1984); S.c. CODE ANN. § 35-1-340
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Uniform Act decisions, however, recognized a possible due process
problem and accordingly analyzed the "element of the offense" argument in light of the constitutional law related to presumptions and
shifting burdens. 27 All but one of these decisions expressly held that
the burden of proving exemptions should rest on the defendant. 28
While most post-Uniform Act courts reaffirmed the view of the
early courts, other courts redefined and reduced the nature of the defendant's burden by holding that he need only satisfy the burden of
production and not the entire burden of proving an exemption. 29
Under this minority view, the state was then required to disprove any
claimed exemption. 30 What little federal law exists in this area appears
to adopt the minority view. 3l
The rationales behind the decisions that adopt the minority view

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

(Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31-98 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. arts. 581-587 (Vernon 1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-14.5 (Supp.
1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4222 (1970); VA. CODE § 13.1-514(d) (1978 & Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.540 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(d)
(1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.24(5) (West Supp. 1983); WYo. STAT. § 17-4114(d) (1977).
United States ex rei Shott v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967); State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1,9-10 (N.D. 1981); State
v. Frost, 57 Ohio St. 2d 121, 125-28, 387 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (1979); State v.
Fairchild, 298 S.E.2d 110, 121-22 (W. Va. 1982); see infra text accompanying
notes 84-90 (discussing Frost and Goetz).
The only court that did not expressly sanction the placement of the burden on the
defendant was the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in State v.
Fairchild, 298 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 1982). Rather than reject the defendant's contention that the state should be required to prove exemptions, the Fairchild court
assumed arguendo that the contention was correct since the state had sufficiently
proved the absence of any exemption. Thus, the court found it unnecessary to
decide the constitutionality of requiring defendants to prove exemption. Id at
122.
Commonwealth v. David, 365 Mass. 47, 54-56, 309 N.E.2d 484, 488-90 (1974);
People v. Dempster, 396 Mich. 700, 711-14, 242 N.W.2d 381, 387-88 (1976); Cox
v. State, 523 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d
173, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas impliedly overruled Dean and Cox in Koah v. State, 604 S.W.2d 156, 163 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980), and adopted the majority view that places the entire burden of
proving exemption upon the defendant.
This minority view was defined by the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v.
Dempster, 396 Mich. 700, 242 N.W.2d 381 (1976), where it stated:
[O)nce the state establishes a prima facie case of statutory violation,
the burden of going forward, i.e., of injecting some competent evidence
of the exempt status of the securities, shifts to the defendant. However,
once the defendant properly injects the issue, the State is obliged to establish the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id at 714,242 N.W.2d at 388 (citations omitted).
The federal view on proving blue sky exemptions is difficult to determine because
of the paucity of decisions discussing the issue. See United States v. Dinneen, 463
F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1972), however, where the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit stated: "Next, [the defendant] argues that the Government
failed to prove that the [issued) stock was not within the exemptions from the
requirements of § 5 of the Act. It was incumbent on the defendant, not the Government, to set up an exception and present proof raising such a defense." Id at
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are varied. One court offered no reason for limiting the defendant's
burden. 32 Other courts analogized the exemption from blue sky registration to other affirmative criminal defenses, such as insanity, which
the state was not required to disprove unless raised. 33 The most noteworthy case in this line of minority decisions is People v. Dempster, 34 a
1976 Supreme Court of Michigan decision. The Dempster court likened
the sale of unregistered securities to carrying a handgun without a permit. Both offenses were governed by statutes containing similar language that placed the burden of proving excuse or exemption upon the
defendant. 35 The court had previously construed the handgun statute
to require the defendant merely to introduce the issue of license or exemption by offering some evidence thereof, thus obligating the state to
prove the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt. 36 In Deml/ster, the
court gave a similar construction to the blue sky provision. 3
In sum, most post-Uniform Act courts deferred to the legislature
and relied on the presence of a statute to reject the contention that the
absence of an exemption should be proven by the state as an element of
the offense. A few of the courts that relied upon section 402(d) recognized a potential due process problem, but found the statutory allocation of the burden acceptable. A minority of the post-Uniform Act
courts, however, modified the burden imposed by section 402(d), requiring only that a defendant assert his entitlement to an exemption
without having to prove that he was in fact exempt. These majority
and minority approaches remain in conflict today.
B.

Development of the Present Due Process ReqUirements

Before analyzing whether section 402(d) is constitutional under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,38 it is necessary to
define the requirements of due process. The test to be applied in analyzing whether defendants can be required to prove certain facts or circumstances to avoid conviction has developed through several
Supreme Court decisions over a period of nearly half a century.
The first major Supreme Court decision to analyze whether the
burden of proving certain facts could constitutionally be shifted from

32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

1041-42. The cases cited in Dinneen are even less helpful in determining the federal stance.
See Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). In Dean, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas stated: "The burden rested with appellant to raise this
exemption defense; then, if raised, the burden shifted to the State to disprove such
defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 178, quoted in Cox v. State, 523
S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
Commonwealth v. David, 365 Mass. 47, 54, 309 N.E.2d 484, 488-89 (1974).
396 Mich. 700, 242 N.W.2d 381 (1976).
Id at 712, 242 N.W.2d at 387.
See People v. Henderson, 391 Mich. 612, 218 N.W.2d 2 (1974).
Dempster, 396 Mich. at 713, 242 N.W.2d at 388; see supra note 30.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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the prosecution to the defense was Morrison v. California. 39 In Morrison, the Court invalidated a California statute that made it a criminal
offense for an alien to own land because the statute expressly required
the defendant to prove his citizenship to exonerate himself. 40 Although
holding that the state should have been required to prove the lack of
citizenship. the Court conceded that "within limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a defendant."41 The court proceeded to define
those "limits" and found that the statute had clearly exceeded them.42
One commentator has attributed to Morrison what has become known
as the "comparative convenience" test for determining the validity of
affirmative defenses. 43 This commentator and others acknowledge that
later developments in the law have made this test an insufficient basis
for shifting the entire burden of proof to a criminal defendant. 44
In Tot v. United States,45 the second major decision in this area,
the Supreme Court defined the limits on the legislature's ability to shift
the burden of proof onto criminal defendants. At issue in Tot was a
statute that created a presumption that the defendant had to rebut to
39. 291 U.S. 82 (1934). Morrison was not the first Supreme Court case to analyze the
issue as indicated by the Court's partial reliance on McFarland v. American Sugar
Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916). Although McFarland recognized that the legislature
cannot go beyond certain limits in shifting burdens of proof to a defendant, it did
not discuss these limitations.
40. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 96-97.
41. Id at 88.
42. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, stated:
The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved
enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has
been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of
the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting
the accused to hardship or oppression.
Id at 88-89.
43. Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29
ARK. L. REv. 429, 436-37 (1976).
The language from Morrison relied upon in formulating the comparative
convenience test is as follows: "For a transfer of the burden [of proof] there must
be in any event a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for
knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to everyone
who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception." Morrison, 291
U.S. at 91 (citation omitted). The American Law Institute has also incorporated
this language into its definition of an affirmative defense: "A ground of defense is
affirmative, within the meaning of Subsection (2)(a) of this Section, when: . . . it
involves a matter of excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant on which he can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
44. Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 436-37, 455; Note, supra note 23, at 886. Later
decisions have expressly held that mere convenience of proof or access to information will not justify shifting the burden of persuasion onto a criminal defendant. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975); Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
45.319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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avoid conviction. 46 The Tot Court invalidated the statute, holding that
the state cannot prove some facts and then presume the ultimate facts
necessary to establish guilt unless there is some rational relationship
between the facts proved and those presumed. 47 Otherwise the defendant would have "the obligation of exculpation."48
Perhaps the most influential decision in the area of shifting burdens of proof was In re Winship,49 a 1970 Supreme Court decision.
Although the primary issue in Winship was the definition of the appropriate standard of proof to be applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings,50 the decision was invaluable in defining the requirements of due
process. Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan wrote: "[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conevery fact
viction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged "5 This holding emphasized the important interests of the defendant that are at
stake in a criminal prosecution, namely his liberty and his good
name. 52 The Court also considered the importance of reducing the risk
of erroneous convictions, 53 as well as maintaining public trust and confidence in the criminal justice system. 54 Winship's definition, while invaluable, has been subject to conflicting interpretations. Some view it
as mandating an elemental apgroach in determining what a defendant
may be called upon to prove. 5 Others though hail the Court's use of
the terminology "every fact necessary to constitute the crime,"56 coupled with the absence of the word "element," as the "seeds for abandonment of the formalistic elements approach."57

r

46. The statute made it a crime for a twice-convicted felon to receive a firearm or
ammunition that had been shipped in interstate commerce. Upon proof of possession of the firearm by this person, and that he had twice been convicted of a crime
of violence, it was presumed that the firearm was shipped in interstate commerce.
Id at 464.
47. Id at 469.
48. Id
49. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
50. Id at 359.
51. Id at 364 (emphasis supplied).
52. Id at 363-64.
53. Id at 363.
54. Id at 364.
55. See Note, Burden oj Proving Affirmative Ilifense Can Be Placed on Ilifendant, 29
MERCER L. REV. 875, 877 (1978).
The elemental approach represents more of a statutory development than a
constitutional analysis. It is a formalistic approach that is used to distinguish elements of an offense from exceptions or exemptions strictly on the basis of whether
the exception is included within the enacting clause of the statute. As a test for
determining the constitutionality of a statutory scheme, this approach may be easily undermined by the state as the Court recognized in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684,698-99 (1975). For a further discussion of the elemental approach, see
Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 437-41. For a blue sky decision applying the elemental approach analysis, see State v. Buchman, 361 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1978).
56. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
57. Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 442.
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The full scope of Winship was not realized until the Supreme
Court's 1975 decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur. 58 In Mullaney, the issue
was whether the state could constitutionally punish all intentional killing as murder unless the defendant could disprove the presumption of
malice by showing that the killing was the result of heat of passion on
sudden provocation. 59 The prosecution contended that because absence of heat of passion, i.e., malice, was not a "fact necessary to constitute the crime,"60 and was only related to the degree of punishment to
be imposed, Winship was inapplicable. 61 The Court rejected this contention and extended the Winship due process requirement beyond the
mere elements of the crime to all factors that affect the degree of culpability and the extent of punishment to be imposed. 62 To limit Winship
to the facts that constitute a crime, reasoned the Court, would encourage states to simply redefine different crimes to circumvent its
holding. 63
In reaching its decision, the Mullaney Court emphasized the same
interests of both society and the defendant that were the bases for the
Winship holding. Among others, the Court emphasized society'S interest in the reliability of jury verdicts, as well as the importance of reducing the risk of erroneous convictions. 64 The Court rejected the state's
justification for shifting the burden to the defendant, i.e., the difficulty
in proving a negative. 65
One commentator has interpreted Mullaney as requiring a balancing of the interests involved in light of Winship to determine whether
the fact at issue is "critical" and should thus be proven by the state. 66
Other commentators have either viewed the decision as a limited holding requiring state courts to reexamine affirmative defenses on a caseby-case basis,67 or have criticized it for failing to enunciate a test for
determining the substance of a crime. 68
In Patterson v. New York, 69 decided two years after Mullaney, the
Supreme Court redefined the test for determining whether the burden
of proving certain facts could be placed upon a criminal defendant. On
facts almost indistinguishable from Mullaney, the Court affirmed a second-degree murder conviction under a New York statute that required
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

421 U.S. 684 (1975).
lei. at 691-92.
Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696-97.
lei. at 697-98.
lei. at 698-99.
lei. at 699-701.
lei. at 701-02.
Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 447.
Note, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493, 509 (1976).
Dutile, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Comment on The MullaneyPatterson Doctrine, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 380, 382 (1980) (criticizing both Mullaney and Patterson for failing to provide guidelines); Note, supra note 55, at 879.
69. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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a defendant to prove affirmatively that he was acting under the influence of extreme emotional distress so as to reduce the crime to manslaughter. 70 By employing an elemental approach, something it had
earlier eschewed as a means of undermining Winship, 71 the Court distinguished Mullaney, or at least limited it to its facts.72 The important
interests that were relied upon in Winship and Mullaney were no longer
considered paramount in Patterson.
While recognizing the potential for legislative abuse, and even
cautioning that it may sometimes be necessary to look beyond a statutory definition of a crime to ensure that the legislature has neither accidentally nor intentionally mislabeled an element of the offense, the
Court made it clear that one cannot question the manner in which a
state legislature chooses to define a criminal offense absent an obvious
due process violation. 73 Furthermore, the Court held that a state need
not disprove affirmative defenses 74 nor must it prove the nonexistence
of mitigating circumstances "if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.'>7S The rule derived from
Patterson is essentially a restatement of Winship with some altered terminology to indicate the adoption of the elemental approach.76
Patterson may best be understood by viewing it in the broad context of federalism. 77 Like Mullaney, the decision has been criticized for
its failure to formulate a workable test for distinguishing defenses from
elements of the crime. 78 Some believe that in its desire to limit the
broad scope that Mullaney had given to Winship, the Patterson Court
simply went further than it intended. 79
In summary, "[t]here is no black letter rule as to when it is proper
to allocate the burden of proof to the accused."80 Patterson, though,
70. Id at 216.
71. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
72. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215-16; see also Note, supra note 55, at 882 ("Patterson
drained Winship of much of its vitality and virtually restricted Mullaney to a single specific set of facts."). For a suggestion that Palferson rejected Mullaney, see
Note, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Difenses After Patterson v. New York,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 655, 665 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, After Patterson];
Note, Patterson v. New York, Criminal Procedure-The Burden of Proof and Affirmative Difenses, 9 U. ToL. L. REV. 524, 544 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Patterson v. New York] ("Palferson provides the blueprint to sidestep the due
process requirements of Winship and Mullaney. 7
73. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
74. Id
75. Id at 209.
76. The Court remarked: "[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of
the offense of which the defendant is charged." Id at 210 (emphasis supplied);
see supra text accompanying note 51.
77. See Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 661; Note, Patterson v. New York,
supra note 72, at 542; Note, supra note 55, at 881.
78. See Note, Patterson v. New York, supra note 72, at 544.
79. Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 678.
80. Id at 655.
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represents the most recent Supreme Court analysis on the constitutionality of affirmative defenses. In essence, the state is only required to
prove the facts that constitute elements of the crime charged, i.e., those
matters contained within the statutory provision. Although it may be
necessary to question the manner in which a legislature has defined a
particular offense, courts should do so only when it it obvious that the
limits of due process have been exceeded. Otherwise, the legislature
may constitutionally require a defendant to prove affirmatively facts
not contained within the statutory definition of the offense, and the
state need not prove the nonexistence of those facts.
III.
A.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 402(d)
An Overview

Most state courts currently require defendants to prove exemption
from a blue sky registration requirement. The following will trace the
development of this requirement in the context of section 402(d).
A majority of courts during the early period of blue sky regulation
relied on untested statutes in placing the burden of proof on defendants, or otherwise justified this placing of the burden. 81 None of the
early courts questioned the due process implications of placing the burden on the accused rather than on the prosecution. These decisions
were then codified in the Uniform Act,82 and after the adoption of the
Uniform Act, many state courts deferred to their respective legislatures
and accepted the placement of the burden upon the defendant. 83 Current law, therefore, is founded upon a few old decisions that are of
doubtful validity today.
This conclusion does not amount to a criticism of the early courts
for their failure to consider the due process issue, because the Supreme
Court had not yet outlined the due process limitations on the shifting of
burdens of production and proof. The post-Uniform Act decisions,
however, were made in a different constitutional environment, and
mere reliance on the language of section 402(d) or the early decisions is
questionable in light of later Supreme Court holdings. Equally questionable are the recent decisions that recognized the due process issue,
but simply relied upon Patterson v. New York 84 and failed to analyze
the question in a coherent fashion.
A decision that illustrates the failure to analyze a statute similar to
section 402(d) in light of the present requirements of due process is
State v. Frost, 85 decided in 1979 by the Supreme Court of Ohio. In
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See supra notes 5-6.
See supra note 15.
See supra note 26.
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
57 Ohio St. 2d 121,387 N.E.2d 235 (1979).
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Frost, before proceeding to outline the major Supreme Court decisions
discussed above,86 the court seemingly assumed that exemptions were
affirmative defenses. Relying upon Patterson, the court concluded that
the state was not required to disprove these defenses. 87 The court did
not discuss the elements of the offense until the end of its opinion,88
and did not provide any further analysis.
A similar decision is State v. Goetz,89 a 1981 decision by the
Supreme Court of North Dakota. As in Frost, the court provided an
excellent overview of the developments of the due process requirements. 90 After outlining the law, however, the court immediately concluded that "the state did offer proof of every essential element of the
offense."91 Although doing so would have proved fruitless, the court
did not attempt to define the "essential elements" of the crime, thus
leaving room to question how it reached its conclusion. The Goetz
court did not engage in any further analysis.
As these recent decisions illustrate, Patterson v. New York 92 does
not provide a bright-line test for determining the constitutional limits
of burden-shifting. The most persuasive explanation for this shortcoming is that the Supreme Court wanted to emphasize the importance of
leaving the administration of criminal law to the states,93 and did not
want to question the manner in which state legislatures define various
crimes and defenses. Simply because the Supreme Court chose not to
question state legislative decisions involving the definition of criminal
offenses absent an obvious due process contravention is not a valid reason for state courts to adopt a similar position. Yet, as Goetz and Frost
exemplify, some have done exactly that. Surely the Court did not intend for courts to adopt this position because it would leave state legislatures virtually unchecked.
A valid reason thus exists for questioning the manner in which
courts have interpreted section 402(d) of the Uniform Act. A reasoned
analysis is necessary to determine whether a defendant charged with
violating a blue sky registration provision may constitutionally be re86.ld at 124-28,387 N.E.2d at 238-39; see supra notes 49-77.
87. Frost, 57 Ohio St. 2d at 127, 387 N.E.2d at 239.
88. The end of the opinion stated:
It remains with the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
essential elements of the offense: (I) that the offense was committed in
the county; (2) that the defendant was selling securities without having
been licensed as a security dealer; and (3) that the defendant was selling
unlicensed securities.
Id at 128, 387 N.E.2d at 239. What the court characterized as one offense is
actually two separate offenses. A person can be charged with selling securities
without being licensed to do so, or simply selling unlicensed securities, or both as
was Frost.
89.312 N.W.2d I (N.D. 1981).
90. Id at 9-10.
91. Id at 10.
92.432 U.S 197 (1977).
93. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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qui red to prove exemption from the Uniform Act. The following provides a suggested approach for resolving this issue.

B. A Suggested Analysis
1. The Elements of the Offense
As discussed above,94 there are obvious infirmities in relying upon
the elemental approach for determining whether an unconstitutional
burden has been placed upon a defendant. The Supreme Court has
recognized the ease with which this analysis can be undermined. 95 Despite its shortcomings, however, the elemental approach is a valuable
touchstone in analyzing the constitutionality of section 402(d). In using
this approach to analyze an offense, attention is focused upon the statutory definition of the offense to determine whether all of the essential
elements are characterized as such and have not been either labeled
affirmative defenses or disregarded totally. The logical starting point,
therefore, is to see how the legislature has defined the particular
offense.
Only two courts have expressly enumerated the elements of a blue
sky registration violation. 96 Both decisions involved dual violations,
i.e., the defendant failed to both register himself as a broker-dealer in
securities and to register the securities in which he dealt.97 This discussion though concerns only prosecutions for failing to register the securities that were issued. As listed by these courts, the offense of selling
unregistered securities contains two elements: (1) that the offense occurred within the geographical jurisdiction of the court; and (2) that the
securities sold were not registered. 98 Since the offense is statutory and
is derived from the Uniform Act, other courts would presumably concur in this listing of the elements.
The above listing places no burden on the state to prove that the
securities sold had to be registered, only that they were not registered.
Interestingly, early blue sky regulation provided that the state was required to prove the additional element that the securities were of a class
that had to be registered. 99 This requirement has inexplicably vanished
94. See supra note 55.
95. See supra notes 63 and 72 and accompanying text.
96. United States ex rel Shott v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 196 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967); State v. Frost, 57 Ohio St. 2d 121, 127-28,387 N.E.2d
235, 239 (1979). Fros/ is discussed at supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
97. See supra note 87.
98. United States ex rel Shott v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 196 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967); State v. Frost, 57 Ohio St. 2d 121, 127-28,387 N.E.2d
235, 239 (1979).
99. See People v. Johnson, 355 Ill. 380, 388, 189 N.E. 271, 275 (1934) ("evidence must
be produced by the people showing in what classes the securities belong in a prosecution under the act"), relied upon in People v. Baldwin, 289 Ill. App. 126, 134,6
N.E.2d 904, 908 (1937) ("the burden is upon the people to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the securities sold were Class D securities [i.e., ones that had to be
registered]"). In People v. Wilson, 375 Ill. 506, 512, 31 N.E.2d 959, 961 (1941),
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from the definition of the offense. If the state is only required to prove
that the securities involved were unregistered, it is simply begging the
question of whether they had to be registered before they could be offered and lawfully sold. What has occurred with the offense of selling
unregistered securities may be an example of what the Supreme Court
feared in Mullaney, 100 and what some believe Patterson 101 legitimized
- the redefinition of an offense to ease the state's burden by transforming an element of the crime into an affirmative defense, thus requiring
an accused to prove his innocence.
The only explanation for the absence of the third element of the
offense is that it has been converted into a presumption to lessen the
state's burden. Under this allocation, the state need only prove that the
defendant issued unregistered securities within the jurisdiction of the
court, and the law presumes that the securities were subject to registration, that is, were not exempt. It is then incumbent upon the defendant
to rebut the presumption and affirmatively prove that he was not required to register the securities before selling them.
The constitutionality of shifting the burden in this fashion necessarily rests on the validity of the presumption employed. 102 The next
step in the analysis, therefore, is to test the presumption.
2.

The Validity of Presuming the Necessity of Registration

There are several ways to test the validity of a presumption, one of
which is to apply the rational connection test. 103 Under this test, a presumption is only valid if the facts presumed bear some rational connection to the facts proved. In this case, the fact presumed is that the
securities issued were required to be registered. The issue is whether
this rationally follows from proof that unregistered securities were sold.
Although a rational connection between the two is not readily apparent, this does not necessarily invalidate the presumption.
Since presumptions and affirmative defenses are closely related,I04
another method for determining the validity of the presumption is to
apply the comparative convenience test. 105 This test is usually applied

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

decided four years after Baldwin, the Supreme Court of Illinois clarified its earlier
decision by holding that the state need not prove that the sale of the unregistered
securities took place under circumstances that would make it exempt. This holding was reaffirmed by the Appellate Court of Illinois in People v. Smith, 315 Ill.
App. 100, 104,42 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1942).
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); see supra note 63 and accompanying
text.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see supra note 72.
See Note, supra note 23, at 883.
See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the rational
connection test, see Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 471-74.
Both concepts require a defendant to come forward and produce evidence on an
issue. See Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 472; Note, supra note 23, at 884.
See supra note 43.
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to affirmative defenses. Originating in Morrison v. California, 106 the
key to this test is whether there exists "a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge" to justify relieving the
state from having to produce evidence on an issue until it has been
fairly raised by the defendant. 107 According to the Morrison Court, a
"manifest disparity" exists "where a general prohibition is applicable to
every one who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception."108 This is precisely analogous to the presumption created under
the blue sky provisions that generally prohibit all sales of securities unless a person can show that he falls outside the prohibition and is therefore exempt from prosecution.
The creation of the presumption thus has a valid basis, and a defendant in a prosecution for selling unregistered securities can constitutionally be required to offer some proof of his claimed exemption from
the provisions of the Uniform Act. Although this disposes of any objections to the minority view on shifting the burden of proving exemptions,l09 further analysis is necessary. The comparative convenience
test justifies placing the burden of producing some evidence on the exemption issue, but it is not considered a sufficient ground for requiring
a defendant to bear the entire burden of proof, including the risk of
nonpersuasion. 110 Because most courts have interpreted statutes like
section 402(d) to require a defendant in a blue sky prosecution to bear
the entire burden of proving exemption, III it remains to be seen
whether this practice is permissible within the limits of due process.
3.

The Constitutionality of Placing the Burden of Persuasion on the
Defendant

There are several arguments against placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant. Prior to discussing these arguments, however,
the following will survey the arguments in favor of such a shift.
A common justification for requiring a defendant to bear the entire burden of proof is what has been termed the "greater includes the
lesser" rationale. 112 It is believed that the Supreme Court, at least partially, relied upon this justification in Patterson v. New York. 113 This
theory provides that if the legislature may criminalize certain conduct
without providing for a particular defense, then allowing such a de106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
1I2.

291 U.S. 82 (1934).
fd. at 91.
fd.

See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
See Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 437,451 n.120; Note, supra note 23, at 882.
See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of this theory, see Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 667.
Defenses arising under this theory have been referred to as "fair compromise"
defenses. See Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 459-67.
lB. 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see Dutile, supra note 68, at 382; Note, After Patterson, supra
note 72, at 667.
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fense is a gratuitous gesture on its part that justifies requiring a defendant to bear the entire burden of proving the defense. The corollary to
this is that if a defense is constitutionally mandated, i.e., an element of
the offense, then the defendant cannot be required to bear the burden
of persuasion. 114 As applied in a blue sky registration context, since all
sales of unregistered securities may be punished, permitting certain
transactions involving a particular number or type of securities to be
made on an exempt basis is arguably a bonus to the defendant that
justifies requiring him to prove that his transaction falls within the exempted class. Although at first glance this reasoning seems appealing,
a closer analysis suggests otherwise.
This rationale arguably tends to legitimize all affirmative defenses
because of the difficulty in determining the elements of an offense. I IS
In the present analysis it has been suggested that the necessity of registration prior to offering for sale is an element of the offense of selling
unregistered securities. 116 It has further been suggested that the state
has already been permitted to ease its burden in the prosecution of
these cases by presuming the necessity of registration and requiring the
defendant to offer some evidence to the contrary before it must discuss
the exemption issue. I 17 To shift upon the defendant the burden of persuasion as to this presumed element would relieve the state of its burden, something disallowed even under Patterson. 118
Other asserted justifications for shifting the burden of persuasion
to a defendant include the difficulty the state would have in proving a
negative, i.e., that the transaction or the securities offered are not exempt, and that the facts required to prove the issue are peculiarly
within the defendant's knowledge. It is fairly well settled that neither
constitutes a sufficient ground for relieving the state of its burden. I 19
The arguments against shifting the burden of persuasion stem primarily from an emphasis on the important interests recognized by the
Supreme Court in Winship and Mullaney. 120 If one accepts the view
that Patterson was a decision based on federalism l21 then the previously recognized societal interests in reducing the risk of erroneous
convictions and maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice
system, as well as the defendant's interests in avoiding the stigma of a
conviction and maintaining liberty,122 still must be considered para114. Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 667 -6S. The corollary is actually an incorporation of Winship and Pallerson, which held that the state must prove all of the
elements of the offense. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
115. Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 66S.
116. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 103-0S and accompanying text.
liS. For the test derived from Pallerson, see supra note 75.
119. See supra notes 65 and 110 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 52-54 and 64 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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mount. Indeed, all of the asserted justifications for shifting the entire
burden of proof have been ruled insufficient to override these
interests. 123
One commentator has reasoned that the burden of persuasion
should be on the prosecution because of the defendant's "fundamental
right" to liberty, i.e., the right to be free from imprisonment. 124 By
characterizing the defendant's right in this fashion, the state is required
to show compelling reasons for infringing upon the right, and must
prove "all issues relevant to guilt."125 At least one other commentator
has similarly placed this broad burden of persuasion on the state. 126
The growing view today is that "the burden of persuasion [should]
be shifted to the defendant only in the most exceptional circumstances."127 Advocates of this view reason that any difficulties the state
may encounter in proving an issue, because of a disparity in the abilities of the state and the defendant to gain access to certain facts, can be
remedied by shifting only the burden of production. 128 It is further
contended, quite persuasively, that shifting only this lesser burden protects the interests of both the state and the defendant since it relieves
the defendant of the risk of nonpersuasion, and eases the state's burden
in not having to disprove every possible affirmative defense until the
defense is put in issue. 129 Accomodating the different interests in this
fashion has no effect on trial procedure "since the facts necessary to
disprove these defenses [such as exemptions] usually are the same facts
introduced as evidence of the crime."130
Thus, it seems clear that the minority interpretation of section
402(d), as stated in People v. Dempster, 131 withstands constitutional
challenge. The majority view, however, does not fare as well under this
analysis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The history of section 402(d) of the Uniform Act indicates that its
purpose was to codify decisional law. All of the early decisions held
that it was proper to require a defendant to prove exemption from blue
sky registration provisions, and none of the courts questioned the constitutionality of this requirement. By adopting the Uniform Act, state
legislatures impliedly approved these decisions, and as later courts de123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See supra notes 65 and 110 and accompanying text.
Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 474-77.
Id
Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 678.
Id; accord Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 479; Note, supra note 23, at 893.
See, e.g., Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 451; Note, supra note 23, at 887-88.
Note, supra note 23, at 893.
130. Id at 888. In proving an unlawful sale of securities the state would logically and
necessarily introduce evidence of the types and number of securities issued and
would therefore contradict most if not all of the possible exemptions.
131. 396 Mich. 700, 242 N.W.2d 381 (1976).
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termined whether section 402(d) was constitutional, most simply deferred to legislative judgment.
The early view that placed upon the defendant the entire burden
of proving blue sky exemption is still prevalent today, as most courts
give statut~ _1.ik_e section 402(d) a literal interpretation. Some of the
more recent decisions have recognized a possible due process problem
with interpreting the statute in this manner, but none has fully analyzed the constitutionality of shifting the entire burden of proving exemptions. By applying recent Supreme Court decisions that outline the
due process requirements in the area of shifting burdens of proof and
persuasion, and focusing on the important interests at stake in a criminal prosecution, there exists valid reason for questioning state court
holdings that interpret section 402(d) as shifting the entire burden of
proving exemptions onto the defendant in criminal prosecutions.
Although most courts that have analyzed the issue of blue sky exemption have placed the entire burden of proof on a defendant, a few
courts have interpreted statutes similar to section 402(d) as requiring
only that a defendant raise the issue of an exemption by offering some
proof, thus leaving to the state the ultimate burden of proving that
none is present. Analysis reveals that this limited shift in the burden of
proof is not only constitutional, but satisfies the interests of both the
state and the defendant.
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement 132 arguably
leaves state legislative decisions regarding the burdens of proof and defining criminal offenses to the scrutiny of state courts. Until these
courts either adopt the minority interpretation of section 402(d) or provide some reasoned analysis to support the statutory allocation of the
entire burden of proving blue sky exemptions, the constitutionality of
section 402(d), as literally interpreted, remains in doubt.
Anthony J. DiPaula

132. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).

